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Introduction
The very beginnings of the authenticity debate can be traced back to the turn of the 20 th century, when Arnold Dolmetsch, musician, instrument-maker and pioneer musicologist, began writing about the performance of old music. From that time on, an ever-growing number of musicians and scholars have been engaged in the study and performance of music from the Medieval, Renaissance, and Baroque periods.
This constituency, now referred to as the historical, period, or authentic performance movement, or simply the early music movement, emerged alongside those preexisting performance traditions that were inherited from Liszt and the great Romantics and perpetuated by the celebrated virtuosi of the day. Not surprisingly, these two performance ideologies clashed severely, and the tension that grew out of this opposition sparked a heated debate, aptly described by the New York Times as a "war." 1 Armed with the intellectual appeal of positivism and the moralizing force of the term 'authenticity,' the early music movement wielded big guns.
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Among the most important and strongly voiced participants of this war was Richard Taruskin, who, along with Laurence Dreyfus, argued persuasively that early music is actually a modern enterprise and that its aim to recreate history is no more 
Argument
"Do we really want to talk about 'authenticity' any more?" Taruskin asks at the start of his essay. It is a rhetorical question, to which he already clearly knows the answer, and he hopes his readership will have the sense to agree with him. His argumentative strategy is powerful, if a bit sneaky, as he lets his rhetoric do a good deal of the work; upon reading one is left with the feeling that one had better agree, or else risk being without intellectual merit.
He begins by drawing attention to a definition of 'authentic' found in The New
Harvard Dictionary of Music that summarily expresses his greatest woes: "'In performance practice, instruments or styles of playing that are historically appropriate to the music being performed.'" 4 What Taruskin finds so troubling about a definition like this is that it seems to justify, absolutely and authoritatively, one distinct manner of performance, namely, the 'right' one.
This might not be so bad if one is dealing with music for which there are no surviving performance traditions and/or the chief aim of investigation is historical understanding. When the only known performance styles of a particular instrumentlet's say the crumhorn -are native to that instrument's time, to describe them as 'historically appropriate' is practically tautological. Such styles are historically appropriate merely by dint of belonging exclusively to a relic of the past, and there can be no controversy that a meaningful distinction is to be found between authentic 5 crumhorn styles and inauthentic ones. 5 It becomes useful to speak of historical propriety only when differentiating between styles that have different scopes of application, such as Italian vs. German crumhorn styles (if there is such a difference) in a piece by an Italian composer. In those cases it is necessary to convey that a certain style is meant for a certain piece, composer or period. Likewise, in the context of purely historical inquiry, it is important to be able to specify which instruments and playing styles belonged to which period, composer, or location; historical appropriateness is a perfectly apt label for the job. However, 'appropriateness' in this sense is not a value judgment at all, but rather simply an indication of proper historical identification.
Problems start to arise when this notion of historical propriety is applied to performance styles that have evolved into living traditions of modernity. For even though antecedent styles are, admittedly, historically appropriate in the strict sense to the music of their time, 'appropriate' here is "an ineluctably value-laden term…which always carries its invidious antonym in tow" and thus bears unwarranted implications for the later styles that grew out of them. 6 Needless to say the same goes for 'authentic.' This is because the designation of 'authentic' or 'historically appropriate' is meant to classify performance styles according to when, historically, they should be used, and if the use of these terms is "expanded beyond areas of traditional historical concern," it ceases to become clear that the notion of 'should' in question is 5 It is easy to imagine an inauthentic style of crumhorn playing (using it as a drumstick, to name but one). If, however, the crumhorn were to be genuinely incorporated in a contemporary work, whatever playing style were involved would be historically appropriate (and authentic) to that work. 6 Taruskin, 'The Pastness of the Present,' 137.
purely historical. 7 As a result, it appears to signal an aesthetic claim as wellsomething that requires much greater justification in order to be taken seriously.
Indeed, advocates of historical style generally are making an aesthetic claim when they say something is historically appropriate, or at least they would endorse one to that effect. And since the inherent morality of these terms produces a degree of ambiguity about exactly what kinds of claims are being made, one can assume that it is both -but only on the supportive grounds of the historical kind.
According to Taruskin, one is not free to "dissent from the concept" of authenticity when it is used in this way, as doing so would seem to commit one to valuing inauthenticity over authenticity or inappropriateness over appropriateness, which is misrepresentative, to say the least, of any coherent musical viewpoint. or beneficial for fully understanding that work in order to successfully deflect the criticism that the concept of contextuality encourages "the naïve assumption that recreating all the external conditions…of a piece will thus re-create the composer's inner experience of the piece and allow him to 'speak for himself.'" 14 In this particular case, one could easily claim that since the subpar proficiency of the performers was an undesirable contributing factor to the historical context of the Eroica Symphony, it should be left out of any attempts at recreating that context.
Furthermore, one could say that historical contextuality only provides a necessary condition for authenticity and that thoughtful musical interpretation is still a sufficient condition. Of course, this raises new questions, such as how to determine whether part of a work's historical context is desirable or not, or how to make interpretive decisions within contextual limitations, or even why one should bother with the 13 Ibid., 140-1. 14 Ibid., 140.
notion of historical contextuality if it does not guarantee authenticity. However, some of these questions look rather familiar (we will encounter them again soon), and they all point to an issue of greater concern.
That issue, which constitutes a much better argument (not to mention assessment of the real problem at hand) against the use of 'contextual,' happens to be Taruskin's second reason for rejecting the term: "practically all music composed before 1800, and a great deal composed since, is almost invariably heard out of context today-that is, in that most anachronistic of all settings, the concert-hall." 15 To put it simply, contextuality is just not what we seem to be after, for if it were we would be equally committed to recreating the historical context of audiences, which is certainly not the case. Nor should it be. Concert-hall culture benefits society overall, Not only is this sort of total contextuality undesirable, it is also unfeasible. It is one thing to understand a piece of music's historical context, and to allow that understanding to supply or enhance the meaning of the piece. It is something else entirely to attempt to relive that context in hopes that it will supply the same meaning it once did originally. Any effort to recreate the original aural context of a piece is 15 Ibid., 141.
doomed to failure because, even if one somehow successfully replicated the sound of, say, the St Matthew Passion as it was in Bach's time (the mere possibility of which is highly questionable; more on this presently), no human alive today would be capable of hearing it as one would have in Bach's time. There is no way to erase the mark of several hundred years on our musical sensibilities, or even our sense of hearing at all.
A person who has listened to Schoenberg, Wagner, or Cage and experienced the sheer loudness of an airplane, helicopter, or rock concert will never hear music (or anything, for that matter) the same way as a 17 th century peasant who has only heard Baroque sacred music and the sounds of a small village. England. Though the lazy scholar might indeed decide to play from one edition rather than the others based on preference or 'some arbitrary rule,' a scholar truly committed to authenticity, I think, would strive to ascertain why such intentional incongruities exist. In the case of Chopin, one would learn that the countries to which he supplied autographs generally employed three different varieties of piano, and the editorial inconsistencies are a result of Chopin's familiarity with the subtle differences of these instruments and desire to make his pieces sound as best they could on each one. To By living intimately with the works of a composer I endeavor to penetrate his spirit, to move with an increasing ease in the world of his thoughts, and to know them 'by heart' so that I may recognize immediately when Mozart is in good humor or when Handel wants to express triumphant joy. I want to know when Bach is raging and throwing a handful of sixteenths at the face of some imaginary adversary or a flaming spray of arpeggios, as he does in The Chromatic Fantasy. The goal is to attain such an identification with the composer that no more effort has to be made to understand the slightest of his intentions or to follow the subtlest fluctuations of his mind.
32
Thus to realize a composer's intentions is no more the goal of early music performers than it is of anyone else. "The difference," Taruskin performers who seek and/or claim authenticity are in pursuit of. 34 Thus we are able to tease out of Taruskin a contradiction that is very, very subtle, but also very important in resolving all of this apparent tension: the difference between the traditional and authentistic viewpoints cannot purely be one of sonic vs. sensible authenticity, as he claims, because he has already shown that sonic authenticity is not necessarily characteristic of the authentistic viewpoint.
Taruskin is, however, right about the positivistic nature of the authentic performance movement, and so I would like to propose that the fundamental difference between it and traditional performance ideology is not one of aims, but of methodology. Performers such as Landowska, Cooper, and Walter may be just as committed to realizing a composer's intentions as Hogwood, Leonhardt, or
Harnoncourt, but their primary strategy for achieving this end is different with regard to both how those intentions can be discerned and how, once discerned, they should be executed. Before I continue, I suppose I must say something about the possibility of the notion of composers' intentions as viable grounds for authenticity, since this has previously been called into question. As far as I am aware, however, Taruskin provides the most compelling and sustainable arguments against this possibility, and I take it that I have successful refuted these. I should thus like to shift the burden of proof to the other end, i.e. to showing that the notion is either fundamentally incoherent, or else that it is for some reason incapable of providing the grounds for authenticity. For the time being, then, I will assume the truth of such a possibility. 34 In case it is of concern, I do not mean to offer this point as proof that historical verisimilitude cannot be constitutive of what we should mean by 'authenticity,' but only that it cannot be constitutive of what we do seem to mean by 'authenticity.' Whether it is necessary to change the definition has yet to be determined, though I highly doubt that doing so would bring it any closer to the notion of historical verisimilitude.
Thus, let us continue with the differences in methodology between the 'authenticists'
and the 'non-authenticists.' there is also an implicit assumption, shared by all its members, that composers, whatever specific intentions they might have, also to some extent intend their pieces to be played well -to the best of the ability of the performer. Naturally, the more a performer understands and identifies with a piece, the better he or she will play it.
Thus there is logic in the assumption that the interpretation that a performer most intimately feels and which affords the greatest understanding of the piece is the one the composer intends. I will return to this line of thought momentarily.
Landowska explicitly acknowledges that, for her, "the means" by which she any other source of discovery is subject to objection and dismissal. Discernment of these intentions is only an act of interpretation insofar as one interprets the source material -a rather minor exegetical feat, without much need for imagination.
Creativity is thus replaced by objectivity, and the whole endeavor is approached with the scholarly and methodological rigor of a positivistic science.
So it is in theory. Truth be told, in practice, adherence to such stringencies varies greatly from one individual to the next. Some performers do choose to leave the gaps in historical evidence (which, continuing our previous assumption, there will always be), open in performance, including with the bare notes only those interpretive aspects that can be proven on a positive documentary basis and hence suppressing all subjective, individualistic, and creative tendencies. To these performers, the way they play truly is determined by lottery. that is just as often made as it is not. What is distinctive about the methods of early music, then, which characterizes both the creative and the rigid authenticists, is that all emphasis is placed on historical evidence; creative interpretation, when involved at all, is either made to appeal to the evidence or else relegated to an inferior role.
Whether these methods constitute a result that can properly be termed 'authentic,' even just in the sense of indicating proper historical correspondence, depends rather largely on the size of the gaps in the evidence. Certainly when they are so big as to severely underdetermine the performance style in question, any performance that limits itself to what can be objectively determined (or one that fills the gaps imaginatively) cannot admit of being totally authentic, though it may be more so than other performances. Indeed, unless one is unduly optimistic about the kind of historical picture we can acquire from fragmentary evidence, it seems likely that there will always be gaps, and thus authenticity will never be achieved in the strongest sense of the term, denoting the authority of the original. Lewis Lockwood is surely correct in his assertion that 'authenticity' "represents a goal that is, on the one hand, a historical improbability…" 41 However, this does not mean that the enterprise of early music is without immense scholarly and artistic value. I see this value as more or less a given nowadays -the 'battle' fought by early music seems to have finally been won. 42 Nevertheless, this does not warrant Lockwood's claim that, on the other hand, authenticity is "a philosophical necessity." 43 Early music is not inherently valuable as an artistic object for its methodology, for it is entirely conceivable that someday (or in a parallel universe) people might not appreciate even a modicum of historical authenticity -their aesthetic sensibilities may leave them only wanting to hear Bach on a synthesizer. Granted, it is inherently valuable as an object of scholarship, but that is beside the point, as Lockwood is clearly making a claim about musical practices.
Perhaps the metaphysician in me is too eager to pounce, and he is only using the word 'philosophical' as a synonym for 'ideological.' If this is the case, then he is absolutely right that, given our current aesthetic sensibilities and our widespread recognition of the interpretive authority sustained by the composer's genius, it is necessary to seek historical authenticity in order to be in keeping with the taste of the time. However, it is not metaphysical necessity that places such demands on the performer, but rather the necessity of obligation to the mainstream. (Ironically, it is this same necessity that so stubbornly resisted the success of the early music movement.) This might seem to weaken the persuasive force of early music ideology, but it is only unfairly, because of words like 'authenticity,' that such force has been acquired to begin with. In truth, no single performance ideology, including one that appeals to the positivistically oriented minds of the age of science, can claim any more authority than any other, except through that which is invested in it by the people who believe in it. Authority granted in this way is, of course, far from meaningless, and recognizing its significance does much to explain why early music, while intellectually appealing for its methods, is artistically appealing for its novelty and opportunity for inventiveness.
The concept of authenticity has been important in the success and development of the early music movement, but now that its practices can stand on their own as artistically valid objects of the mainstream, it should no longer be needed, hence used, other than to make explicitly historical claims.
